Surprisingly, a Voluntary Climate Treaty Could Actually Work

Negotiators around the world are deliberating proposals for an international climate change treaty that will contain a glaring loophole: It won’t be binding.

That’s less than ideal, but it’s still worthwhile for several important reasons.

First, all treaties are essentially voluntary, short of violators being placed under severe sanctions or the threat of war. Second, the more binding the language of the treaty seems, the less likely it is that countries will make any commitment to act. And third, the only previous international treaty to reduce greenhouse gas emissions was surprisingly successful. For these reasons, the treaty to limit greenhouse gas emissions that may emerge from the December conference that is to take place in Paris — binding or not — is an important step forward in confronting climate change.

But we can’t count on it alone.

Countries will comply only if they judge it to be in their interest, and this will require public support in the years ahead.

Let’s explore further what “internationally binding” emissions agreements really are. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol is perhaps the most salient example. It required countries to have mandatory greenhouse gas emissions reduction requirements. The United Nations then monitored those requirements to determine whether countries met their commitments, but it couldn’t force compliance. Thus, the Kyoto Protocol was ultimately a political agreement that countries could later change their minds about. In this sense, even internationally binding agreements are voluntary.

 

Moreover, the “binding” nature can do more harm than good by possibly deterring some countries from joining. That was the case when the United States refused to ratify the Kyoto agreement. And although China and India — now the world’s other top emitters — did sign the Kyoto agreement, the move was largely symbolic: They were not required to make any emissions cuts because under Kyoto they were designated “Non-Annex I” or “developing” nations.

That said, countries’ commitments from Kyoto — a treaty that was binding in writing and voluntary in nature — produced surprising results. Most countries met and even exceeded their pledged reduction targets for greenhouse gas emissions from 2008 to 2012. Over all, the world reduced emissions 25 percent more than had been pledged in the treaty.

Country-level analyses lend more texture. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine had the greatest drop in emissions, which measured 52 percent below their Kyoto commitment. This can largely be explained by the economic troubles those regions experienced after the fall of communism. But even excluding Russia and these former Soviet republics, the world reduced emissions by 10 percent more than the Kyoto pledges.

Among countries besides Russia and these former Soviet republics, some have been more successful than others in reducing emissions because they were proactive. For example, the European Union reduced its emissions by 11 percent more than it had pledged. This was largely because of the creation of an innovative market that allowed emitters to trade permits for the rights to emit the greenhouse gases that cause climate change, a decision inspired — but not required — by the Kyoto commitment. The European Union leaders were surely motivated by their electorates’ vocal support for climate policy.

Canada, on the other hand, is 31 percent away from meeting its commitment. Recognizing its shortcomings, Canada withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2011. During that same period, the country’s economy grew with the discovery of tar sands and a boom in oil production. Because the economy and so many jobs rely on carbon-intensive industries, the Canadian government decided that it made less sense to enact emission reduction policies, despite its pledge in Kyoto. The internationally binding treaty did not stop it from leaving.

It is apparent from these examples that an international climate treaty — voluntary or not — depends on the motivations of each participating country. Ultimately, domestic measures — laws, policies and regulations — are necessary to meet the international commitment. Many factors affect these national decisions, including each country’s unique natural resources and economic and cultural circumstances, as well as the degree of its desire to be viewed as a responsible international actor. And as I’ve written, in China and, perhaps, in India as well, growing awareness that people are being exposed to deadly air pollution is playing an important role in the formulation of policy on greenhouse gases. More broadly, all over the world national decisions are being swayed by evidence of damage caused by climate events, and, of course, by the varied responses of the local political system and citizens.

What does this mean for the coming Paris negotiations? It is tempting to long for an internationally binding treaty that guarantees emissions reductions. However, except under extraordinary circumstances, all treaties are ultimately voluntary. Further, any benefits that could come with a more binding commitment must be weighed against the possibility that they could deter some countries from setting goals for emissions reductions.

If history is a guide, whether this treaty’s goals are met will depend on the extent to which countries make mitigation of climate change a domestic priority. This means that even after the hard work of negotiating the Paris treaty is completed, the hardest work will still be in front of us, wherever we live.